Promoting Human Rights in Russia Through Support to Non-governmental Organizations: How to Improve the Strategies of the European Union by Klitsounova, Elena
 
A 
E L E N A  K L I T S O U N O V A
C P S   I n t e r n a t I o n a l   P o l I C y   F e l l o w S h I P   P r o g r a m
2
0
0
6
/
2
0
0
7

C e n t r a l  e u r o p e a n  u n i v e r s i t y
C e n t e r  f o r  p o l i C y  s t u d i e s oPen SoCIety InStItute
Promoting Human Rights in Russia Through 
Support to Non-governmental Organizations: How 
to Improve the Strategies of the European Union
 ELENA KLITSOUNOVA 
 
 
Promoting Human Rights in Russia Through Support  
to Non-governmental Organizations: 
How to Improve the Strategies of the European Union 
 
Abstract 
The European Union places a great deal of emphasis on the promotion of human 
rights, but if it is to develop as a serious actor in this field it will have to find new and 
more creative ways of talking with the Russians about human rights issues. For those in 
the European Union and Russia hoping for a strategic partnership between the two 
parties, a key issue is if and how to improve European Union policies towards the 
Russian Federation. The question for policy makers is how to manage NGOs 
involvement in such a way that it would bring much needed changes to Russia’s human 
rights behaviour. This paper looks at possible ways to strengthen the European Union’s 
policy of promoting human rights in Russia and at the assistance of NGOs in this aim. It 
attempts to provide insight into the complex relationship between the Russian 
government, civil society and the human rights NGO sector. It sheds light on what kind 
of policy instruments have been used and developed in recent years by the European 
Union to assist in the promotion of human rights and looks at why the European Union 
has had limited success in exporting the values of human rights to Russia. Finally it 
offers recommendations for a realistic European Union human rights policy towards 
Russia.
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Introduction 
 
With increasing frequency and intensity the debate over human rights values 
becomes an uneasy background theme in the EU-Russia dialogue. Many 
within the EU are concerned about the weakening of the European orientation 
of Russia – the trend which, according to EU policy-makers, is particularly 
noticeable in the fields of human rights and democratization. There is also 
growing dissatisfaction on the part of both EU and Russian actors stemming 
from the gap between the EU high ambitions to converge Russia on European 
values and its relatively limited achievements in this filed. Nevertheless, the 
EU is still expanding its human rights promotion programs and constantly 
claims that it is eager to keep human rights high in its relationship with Russia. 
For those within the EU and Russia who are still hoping for strategic 
partnership between the two parties, a key practical issue is if and how to 
develop and improve EU policies towards the Russian Federation. 
The EU advocates for itself a policy which includes great deal of human 
rights promotion. This policy is based on the belief that the EU is capable of 
acting as a “norm-sender”, i.e. the belief that by communicating and 
transferring the collection of certain norms and rules to Russia the EU can 
successfully stimulate Russia’s convergence on human rights values. This 
policy also presupposes the existence of non-state actors that can be involved 
in “Europeanization-by-socialization” process and motivated to pressure the 
government for compliance with human rights norms. Consequently, 
supporting those Russian non-governmental organizations that are seen as 
inspired by European values to enlighten Russian public and government has 
become a target of EU’s Russia human rights policy. The question for policy-
makers is no longer whether but how to manage NGOs involvement in such a 
way that it would bring needed changes in Russia’s human rights behavior.  
This paper looks at possibilities to strengthen EU’s Russia policies of 
human rights promotion and NGOs assistance from two perspectives. Firstly, 
it seeks to provide more insights into the complex relationship between 
Russia’s government, civil society and human rights NGO sector and to 
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analyze the potential of human rights NGOs to project European vision of 
human rights into Russia and to be a catalyst for policy change. Secondly, it 
seeks to shed more light on what kind of policy instruments used and 
developed in recent years by the EU to assist human rights promotion in 
Russia.  The focus of this part of the paper is the direct actions and initiatives 
of the Commission, European Parliament and Council rather than the 
programs and policies of individual member-states. This section looks at the 
reasons that the EU has had relatively limited success in exporting human 
rights values to Russia. Finally, the paper offers recommendation for a 
realistic EU’s human rights policy toward Russia. 
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1. Russian human rights NGOs  
Despite the crucial importance of these policy actors, we still know 
considerably little about institutional capacity and practices of human rights 
NGOs in Russia. To paraphrase S. Mendelson and J. Glenn1, little is known –
although much good and bad is believed – about the impact of NGOs on 
Russian policy making process. This paper aims at providing useful insights 
into the development of human rights NGOs community in Russia by taking a 
modest approach – it elaborate only several criteria of this development in 
order to broaden understanding of NGOs’ capabilities to project European 
vision of human rights into Russia and to be a catalyst for policy change. 
 
1.1. The number, roles and networks of human rights NGOs  
 
The last decades have seen exponential growth in the number of NGOs in 
Russia, including those specifically asserting a human rights approach to their 
work. By 2001, Russia has approximately 19,500 human rights NGOs, which 
constituted about 5 per cent of all NGOs registered in the country by that 
time2. Among those active non-governmental organizations which are 
registered in Russia in 2007, hundreds are human rights NGOs3. The last 
                                            
1 S. Mendelson and J.  Glenn, Democracy Assistance and NGO Strategies in Post-
Communist Societies, Carnegie Working Papers, 8/2000, p.6. 
2
 By 2001, according to information from Russian Ministry of Justice, over 375,000 non-
governmental organizations were registered in Russia, and about 5,2 % of them  were human 
rights NGOs. Konovalova L., Yakimets V, “Социальное партнерство между государством и 
неправительственным сектором как фактор развития гражданского общества и 
эффективного управления», Обзорный доклад, Московское бюро Юнеско, 2001; 
http://peace.unesco.ru/docs/konovalova.pdf 
3
 According to the data from the Committee on Statistics of the Russian Federation, in the 
beginning of 2007 there were at least 665,000 registered nongovernmental non-commercial 
organizations operation in Russia. Accurate counts of NGOs in existence were not available, 
as official government records of NGOs included all those that are formally registered, while 
many of them were no longer active. See Доклад общественной палаты Российской 
Федерации о состоянии гражданского общества (2007);  CIVICUS Civil Society Index 
Report for Russia,  2006, available at 
http://www.civicus.org/new/media/CSI_Russia_Country_Report.pdf.  By 15 April 2006, only 
216,000 NGOs managed to re-register according to the new “NGO law”. See “NKO 
prodemonstrirovali vysokuju lekvidnost’”,  Kommersant,  148 (3724), 20.08.2007, available at 
http://www.kommersant.ru/doc.aspx?docsid=796618. 
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decades have also seen quick geographical expansion of human rights 
movement: while throughout the entire Soviet period the movement was 
almost completely concentrated in Moscow, presently human rights NGOs 
operate in all 89 regions of the Russian Federation.  
Russian human rights NGOs are considerably diverse in size, structure, 
and policy ambit: they act as agenda-setting, standard-setting, monitoring and 
enforcement, and aid and education organizations within the field of human 
rights. Some human rights NGOs function primarily to handle individual 
complaints and exhibit a concern with concrete cases of human rights 
violations.  Others do not concentrate on “defense of the right of a concrete 
person in each concrete situation” but rather adopt more broad approach to 
human rights issues and aim to make recommendations on the national 
human rights situation in general and proposals for changes in legislation or 
policies. Some human rights NGOs are more focused on research, in-depth 
teaching on human rights, and providing expertise on specific policy issues, 
while others are less research-driven than engaged in advocacy and 
dissemination of ideas in simplified forms.  
 
While high diversity of the instruments, mechanisms and practices that 
human rights NGOs use in Russia is a striking4, another important 
characteristic of Russian human rights NGOs community is a high level of its 
involvement in various national and transnational knowledge5-, advocacy-, 
and policy-based networks. Many human rights NGOs have already invested 
and continue to invest substantial effort and resources into fostering NGOs’ 
networking. Examples include the “Memorial” Society, The Moscow Helsinki 
                                            
4
 As L. Alekseeva noted that “Each particular organization has its own brand of vigor as well 
as its own successful field of activity. Krasnoyarsk and Novgorod became the first regions to 
bring law students into their public legal aid offices… In Ryazan, as well as in the regions of 
Arkhangelsk, Nizhnii Tagil and Kemerovo, a close interaction between human rights 
organizations and independent trade unions has developed… In Voronezh, Perm’, and 
Tomsk, considerable access has been achieved in making a course on human rights part of 
the mandatory school program. In Rostov, reports on the violations of the rights of conscripts 
and citizens on trial have been published.  …in Nizhnii Novgorod, human rights activists 
monitored torture and beating at the city police stations”.  L. Alekseeva, “Private measures by 
which to ensure fundamental rights in present-day Russia: a view from inside”, Helsinki 
Monitor, Vol. 11, no. 3, 2000 
5
 The RAPN Research Committee on Human Rights Issues is a good illustration of 
knowledge-based human rights networking, http://www.rapn.ru/?grup=291 
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Group (MHG), The Association of Regional Human Rights Organizations, to 
list just a few. At present, the “Memorial” Society has been a network of 
dozens of organizations in different regions of Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, 
Latvia, and Georgia.6 The MHG is another large networking NGO in Russia, 
with about 200 regional organizations participating in MHG network 
initiatives.7 The Association of Regional Human Rights Organizations, initiated 
in 1999 as a network of regional NGOs, united 75 organizations.8 Many other 
networks tend to be less formal, less systematic or less open to public 
scrutiny, including those networks that developed between NGOs from 
Russia, EU member states and international human rights NGOs. It is difficult 
to gauge the degree of diffusion of human rights ideas or policy approaches 
through these networks, but it is likely to be deep.  
The interactions between human rights NGOs at both the Russian and an 
international (European) level have created venues where information is 
transmitted and skills and expertise are shared. It also appears that many 
Russian NGOs have become deeply involved, either directly or through their 
umbrella organizations, in pan-European human rights policy networks – 
where NGO, government and international organization actors share the 
rhetoric, the language, and scholarly discourses that shape the terms of public 
debate over human rights issues and underpin relevant policies. At present, 
considerable number of Russian human rights organizations seems to be 
integrated with the EU milieu and be interested in projecting European norms 
and practices into Russia.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
6 http://www.memo.ru/eng/about/whowe.htm 
7 http://mhg64.valuehost.ru/ 
8 http://www.association.hrworld.ru/citis.htm 
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1.2. Public Support and Awareness 
 
The extent of public awareness and public support for human rights NGOs 
organizations should be among most important indicators of the development 
of these organizations in Russia. Yet, the question still remains to what extent 
Russian public opinion is articulated and informed about the existence and 
work of human rights NGOs and whether people in Russia are prepared to 
apply their declaratory support for these organizations. To date, survey data 
on Russians’ attitudes towards the human rights situation in the country as 
well as towards human rights organizations have provided quite mixed 
evidence. 
First, Russian citizens’ dissatisfaction with the human rights situation in the 
country has been well documented. In its 2006 Russia-wide survey, the 
Levada center found that the majority (68 percent) of respondents did not feel 
protected by the law. Moreover, third of respondents (32 percent) raised their 
concern about serious human rights abuses in the country9. Most recent 
survey found that the 72 percent of Russian respondents were sure that 
human rights are violated in Russia10.  
Second, although human rights situation is seen by the public as serious 
problem affecting enormous number of people, surveys found that only tiny 
minority of Russian citizens (4 percent) believed that they would turn to the 
human rights NGOs for assistance in situations of human rights abuses.11 
Again, survey data provide quite mixed evidence to answer the question why 
the idea of NGOs involvement in human rights protection does not appeal to 
the Russian public. On the one hand, many Russians feel positively about the 
term “human rights protection” in general12 and believe that national, sub-
                                            
9 “Voices from Russia: Society, Democracy, Europe. EU-Russia Center / Levada Center 
Research, February 2007, http://www.eu-russiacentre.org/assets/files/EU-
RC%20Levada%20Research%20Commentary.pdf 
10
 Narushenie prav cheloveka, Levada Center, 09.11.2007, available at 
http://www.levada.ru/press/2007110904.html. 
11
 VCIOM Press-release no. 557, 19.10.2006, http://wciom.ru/arkhiv/tematicheskii-
arkhiv/item/single/3441.html 
12
 “Voices from Russia: Society, Democracy, Europe. EU-Russia Center / Levada Center 
Research, February 2007, http://www.eu-russiacentre.org/assets/files/EU-
RC%20Levada%20Research%20Commentary.pdf 
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national and local governments units should support the activity of human 
rights organizations in every possible way13. On the other hand, the majority of 
Russians seems to have very limited knowledge about human rights NGOs. 
When questioned about specific organizations, most respondents had never 
heard of the most prominent human rights NGOs. The surveys found that only 
22 percent and 8 percent of respondents were familiar with the activities of the 
“Memorial” Society and the MHG, respectively14 (while these two 
organizations are seen by many EU policy-makers as Russia’s most important 
organizations in the field of human rights). Moreover, quite often Russians’ 
understanding of human rights is some that they are guaranteed rather by the 
paternal state responsible for social welfare of its citizens than by non-
governmental organizations. To the extent that citizens are aware of NGOs, 
they typically argue that human rights defense should not be the primarily goal 
of these organizations (see Table 1).  
Summing up, Russian human rights NGOs have not yet grown into a 
movement with a great deal of press coverage or public support; at present 
they are unlikely to be capable of dramatically shifting those domestic 
incentives that define current Russia’s human rights policy. Human rights 
NGOs – their agenda, arguments and practices – do not receive high level of 
engagement from Russians. A whole host of problems has contributed to 
such a situation. Human rights NGO representatives often accuse the mass 
media of providing very limited coverage of NGOs activities and refer to the 
deepening lack of press freedom in Russia. But the situation is complicated 
also by the fact that many Russian human rights NGOs lack carefully-
designed policies of strategic interactions with the public and the media15.  
 
                                            
13
 Recent survey commissioned by the Russian Public Chamber found that 52 percent of 
respondents believed that national, sub-national and local governments should support 
human rights NGOs in every possible way. The overwhelming majority of local government 
servants (67 percent of respondents) also agreed with the idea that human rights 
organizations should be supported. Doklad Obshestvennoj palaty Rossijskoj Federatsii o 
sostojanii grazhdanskogo obshestva (Доклад Общественной палаты Российской 
Федерации о состоянии гражданского общества), 2007. 
14
 Theodore P. Gerber and Sarah E. Mendelson, Strong Public Support for Military Reform in 
Russia. Ponars Policy Memo 288 (May 2003). Available at 
http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/pm_0288.pdf 
15 A.Sevorstyan, Issledovanie effektivnosti raboty pravozashitnyh organizatsij, Moscow, 2005.  
ELENA KLITSUNOVA: PROMOTING HUMAN RIGHTS IN RUSSIA THROUGH 
SUPPORT TO NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS  
 12 
 
 
Areas in which NGOs should be active 
Table 1: 
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45
Protection of women and children
Help for socially vulnerable sections of the population 
Reform of housing and communal services
Education and further education
Health care and medicine
Supporting citizens' initiatives and local self-government
Protecting human rights
Scientific research and technical work
Culture and the arts
Ecology
Sports
Protecting historical and cultural monuments
International cultural exchange
Independent mass media
%
 
Source: Donorskie I nekommercheskie organizatsii: chto my o nih znaem, Moscow 2005, p.39. 
Available at: http://www.donorsforum.ru/images/stories/Resultsresearch.pdf. 
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Failures of public communication experienced by many NGOs can also be 
explained as a result of the difficult normative context they encounter. Recent 
surveys found that Russian citizens perceive human rights in terms of three 
distinct normative dimensions: civil liberties (e.g., freedom of religion, 
association, and expression), economic rights (e.g., the right to work, to own 
property, and to social welfare) and rights of the person (e.g., freedom from 
torture and from arbitrary arrest). Support for these varies greatly, with 
economic rights enjoying the highest level of support (65 percent of 
respondents), civil liberties the least amount of support (12 percent), and 
rights of the person in between16. Given that the majority of Russians back a 
cluster of economic rights while demonstrating a high level of indifference 
toward civil liberties, human rights NGOs should search for new ways in which 
they frame those problems that they are trying to solve.  
One tremendous challenge which Russian human rights NGOs face today 
is a resistant domestic normative context. They are unlikely to succeed in 
reaching the Russian public and becoming a catalyst for human rights policy 
change, unless they manage to convert their claims and agendas into 
messages that resonate with norms that are already widely accepted by the 
Russians.  
 
1.3. NGOs, state actors and human rights policy making 
 
Another crucial challenge for Russian human rights NGOs is building 
cooperative engagement with government and capturing a space in state-
dominated policy-networks. In the early 1990s, many human rights activists 
were members of federal and regional parliaments and governments and had 
deep involvement in drafting and implementing the concept of legal reforms in 
Russia. At that time, much of legal reforms came from those human rights 
activists and organizations who, in the course of post-communist 
transformation, became prominent members of decision- and policy-making 
                                            
16 Theodore P. Gerber and Sarah E. Mendelson, How Russians Think about Human Rights: 
Recent Survey Data. Ponars Policy Memo 221 (December 2001). 
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community. However, by the end of Yeltsin’s era, the political window that had 
allowed a radical legal reform had closed, faster than anyone expected, and 
human rights activists and organizations were “squeezed out” of 
governments. By the end of the 1990s, they had relatively little access to 
decision- and policy-making and faced serious problems in their attempts to 
build new formal and informal channels of access to politicians and 
bureaucrats.  
At present, Russian human rights NGOs can be distinguished from one 
another by their attitudes towards cooperation with government. A number of 
NGOs in principle oppose the idea of fostering cooperative relationship with 
politicians and bureaucrats from Putin’s team. In their view, such cooperation 
would provide Putin’s authoritarianism with respectable “democratic” clothes 
and insulate it from criticism of deteriorating human rights’ situation in the 
country. Others argue that effective advocacy always requires an ongoing 
positive relationship with government and try to use every chance to get 
access to decision- and policy-making as well as to educate or socialize 
decision-makers and actors within government into human rights ideas.     
As non-state actors, human rights NGOs have a limited formal decision-
making role, and therefore they cannot impose policies on a political system.  
What they can do is to exhort. If governmental actors are not receptive to, or 
aware of, non-state actors’ recommendations in a policy area, there is little 
hope for policy change.  Yet, the questions remain (1) to what extent decision-
makers are receptive to NGOs ideas and recommendations; (2) what are the 
opportunities and constraints to NGOs involvement in policy-making. At 
present, the evidence is mixed: 
 
1.3.1. Constraints on NGOs 
 
It is clear that a comparatively closed and centralized political system makes it 
difficult for societal actors, including human rights NGOs, to influence the 
policy-making process with their own independent expertise and creative 
proposals. And the trend appears to be deepening. The centralization of 
political and state institutions grows in parallel with the Russian leadership’s 
CENTER FOR POLICY STUDIES/INTERNATIONAL POLICY FELLOWSHIPS 2006/07 
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efforts to design institutional and organizational arrangements controlling the 
links between state and society and channeling societal demands in carefully 
managed directions. 
 
What is commonly known as “the NGO law” is part of the broader reform which 
aimed at introducing amendments to the Civil code, the law on non-profit 
organizations, the law on public associations, and the law on closed administrative 
territorial formations. The entire reform package is relevant to regulating the work of 
NGOs, but so far the only changes to the law on non-profit organizations have been 
widely discussed. On 23 November 2005, the State Duma accepted the bill “on 
measures aimed at implementing certain provisions of the Federal laws regulating 
activities of non-commercial organizations” at its first reading. Numerous Russian 
NGOs responded to the decision with protests, arguing that the bill was aimed at 
subjecting NGOs to tighter state control and at obstructing their work. They also 
stressed that the bill was at odds with both international standards and the Russian 
constitution. Advocates of the bill had based their argumentation on security and 
political aspects. In justifying the need for stricter control over financial flows to 
Russian NGOs, Russian officials referred to the fight against terrorism and money 
laundering and pointed to restrictions of NGOs to be found in other countries. 
President Putin repeatedly stressed that he opposed the foreign funding of “political 
activities” of NGOs in Russia. The “color revolutions” provided additional discursive 
framework for those commentators who were stressing the need for tighter control 
over NGOs funded by foreign donors.  
On 23 November 2005, the State Duma accepted the bill “on measures aimed at 
implementing certain provisions of the Federal laws regulating activities of non-
commercial organizations” at its first reading. Numerous Russian NGOs responded 
to the decision with protests, arguing that the bill was aimed at subjecting NGOs to 
tighter state control and at obstructing their work. They also stressed that the bill was 
at odds with both international standards and the Russian constitution. Advocates of 
the bill had based their argumentation on security and political aspects. In justifying 
the need for stricter control over financial flows to Russian NGOs, Russian officials 
referred to the fight against terrorism and money laundering and pointed to 
restrictions of NGOs to be found in other countries. President Putin repeatedly 
stressed that he opposed the foreign funding of “political activities” of NGOs in 
Russia. The “color revolutions” provided additional discursive framework for those 
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commentators who were stressing the need for tighter control over NGOs funded by 
foreign donors.  
Protesting NGOs managed to mobilize their networks and to draw attention of the 
international community to the issue. The Council of Europe, the European Union, 
the United States, the international media became involved in the debate on the 
NGO law. Facing mounting criticism, Russian officials suggested amending the bill 
according to international standards and recommendations made by the Council of 
Europe. After intensive consultations and discussions held in both Moscow and 
Strasbourg, the text was amended in some respects: those requirements that directly 
contradicted the Russian constitution and international law were removed from the 
bill.  
The implementation of the NGO law has began with “Decree No. 212” which was 
issued by the Russian government on 15 April 2006 and came into effect together 
with “Federal Law No. 18-FZ of 10 January 2006 on introducing amendments to 
certain legislative acts of the Russian Federation”. The Russian Tax Authorities and a 
new governmental agency the Federal Registration Service (FRS, “Rosgegistratsia” 
which having existed only since 2004) are to administer this process. The law has 
given considerable authority to the FRS, which, according to Decree No. 1315 signed 
by President Putin on 3 May 2006, was to be is expanded to 14 administrative units 
with a maximum staff of 375 (excluding security and building maintenance staff) and 
a budget of over $900,000 alone in its Federal unit.  Under the new regulations on 
registration procedures, Russian NGOs are subjects to the system of double 
registration by both the tax authorities and FRS. The authorities can reject the 
registration of an NGO at their own discretion on the basis of the content of their 
documents. Under new regulations on accountability procedures, NGOs are now 
required to inform the state authorities in detail about their activities and their 
management, the funds they receive (including donations), their assets, and the 
planned and current use of funds for all programs in Russia. NGOs are required to 
submit annual reports on their activities by April 15. Not submitting timely, annual 
reports might lead to an organization’s liquidation. In addition, the state authorities 
are allowed to demand any document from an NGO at any time, without a warrant, 
and be present at all NGO events.  
The full consequences of the new regulations remain to be seen, yet, many 
NGOs have already evaluated results of the law’s first year of implementation as 
CENTER FOR POLICY STUDIES/INTERNATIONAL POLICY FELLOWSHIPS 2006/07 
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negative.17 It turned out that registration-related expenses are several times higher 
for NGOs than for commercial enterprises. In 2006, 17 % of NGOs applying for 
registration failed to get it.  According to official data, as of July 1, 2007 less than 24 
of percent registered Russian NGOs submitted their annual reports. Thus, according 
to the law, the Federal Registration Service has the right to demand liquidation of 76 
percent of NGOs. Moreover, many of those Russian NGOs which submitted reports 
have already been crossed out of the Unified State Register of Legal Entities, which 
actually meant nearly complete termination of their activities
18
. 
As the current wording of the law is open to broad interpretations and there are 
no objective and clearly-defined criteria for assessing NGO activities, the new law 
allow for arbitrary and selective enforcement of new bureaucratic and political 
pressure on NGOs. 
 
First, recent amendments to the laws regulating activities of non-
governmental organizations19 have dramatically changed the legal 
environment in which NGOs operate and provided the government with more 
opportunities to exert tighter control over NGOs and directly interfere in the 
internal operations of these organizations.20 N. Patrushev, head of Russia’s 
Federal Security Service (FSB) argued in July 2005, “Non-governmental 
organizations must not be allowed to engage in any activity they like… We are 
interested in unifying the respective laws of the Community of the 
Independent States into clear legislation on the activity of NGOs. The NGOs 
must be told what problems they should tackle and for what purpose and they 
should engage in activity of what kind…”21 New “NGOs law” seems to be a 
stronger continuation of this way of thinking about NGO sector. Moreover, the 
                                            
17 For more detail see the Interregional Human Rights Group report “NGOs and the Federal 
Registration Service: Five Problems of Cooperation”, available at 
http://ngo.hrworld.ru/download/FA_2007_Report_send_10.doc. 
18 According to experts of Voronezh Interregional Group of Rights Defenders, in eight regions 
of Russia over 600 NGOs have already been crossed out of the Register. See Kommersant, 
20 August 2007.  
19The  law “On Introducing Amendments to Certain Legislation Acts of the Russian 
Federation”, which is commonly referred to as the NGO law and came into force in April 2006, 
amends four Russian laws – the Civil Code, the Law on Public Associations, the Law on Non-
Profit Organizations, and the Law on Closed Administrative Territorial Formations.  
20 For a detailed analysis of the Law, see the Report by The International Center for Not-for-
Profit-Law, February 17, 2006, available at http://www.icnl.org/knowledge/news/2006/01-
19_Russia_NGO_Law_Analysis.pdf 
21 Newtimes.ru, “No Retreat fom the Cold”, July 2005, 
http://www.newtimes.ru/eng/detail.asp?art_id=1398. 
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“NGO law” is not the only issue at stake, as other legal frameworks regulating 
the activities of Russian non-governmental organizations, including those on 
unions, religious associations, political parties, and business, are also in a 
permanent state of reformation and amendment. Consequently, Russian 
NGOs had to cope with a wide range of reforms over last years. Moreover, 
foreign grant programs are being revised quite frequently, and this also leads 
to considerable changes in the relationship between the state, Russian 
NGOs, and foreign donors. Explanations provided to justify the need for the 
reforms have also contributed to these changes. The Russian president has 
repeatedly stressed that he opposed the foreign funding of “political activities” 
of NGOs in Russia. Meanwhile, non-permissible “political activities” are not 
defined in the laws and can be arbitrarily defined in practice, given that for 
many in Russia the border lines between politics and policy-making is blurred. 
Consequently, many donor organizations have become more careful not to 
interfere with governmental agenda and changed – “depoliticized” – their 
policies and practices toward Russian NGOs. Given this, Russian NGO 
community perhaps rightly fear that many foreign donors will leave in 
disappointment, and that not only legal frameworks but also political economy 
of NGOs development will be dramatically affected by the reforms of NGOs 
legislation in Russia.  
Second, the Russian leadership seems to become more and more serious 
about the non-governmental domain of policy-making and starts dedicating 
more resources to developing networks of “friendly” NGOs. Those “policy 
intellectuals” who support the Kremlin have advanced the idea of the 
importance of “soft power” weapons, which comprise media outlets, internet 
websites, expert networks, and regular conferences.22 And the creation of 
government organized non-governmental organizations – GONGOs – seems 
to have been devised by the Russian officials to tackle criticism at 
international fora and to demonstrate the existence of Russian societal norms, 
                                            
22
 Nicu Popesku, “Russia Soft Power Ambitions”, CEPS Policy Brief, no.115, October 2006. 
Ivan Krastev, “Democracy “Doubles” , Journal of Democracy, Vol. 17, no. 2, April 2006, 
available at  http://www.cls-sofia.org/uploaded/1146585071__4__krastev_pp_52-62.pdf 
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including norms concerning human rights.23 Certainly, the rise of human rights 
GONGOs will increase uncertainty and competition in the sector where 
hundreds of organizations already compete for resources and attention from 
decision-makers and the public.  
 
1.3.1. Opportunities for NGOs 
 
Putin’s move to centralize decision-making power and to deal with the NGOs 
in a more proactive manner – which many criticized as “smart 
authoritarianism” – can ironically make NGOs’ involvement in policy-making 
possible and more effective. 
First, several new institutions have been established to serve as forums for 
both people from government and NGOs. In part to design institutional 
arrangements linking state and society, the Council for Fostering the 
Development of Civil Society was discussed and finally founded in November 
2004, to replace the Presidential Human Rights Commission. Moreover, in 
2003-2006, the “public council and chamber boom” hit Russian regions and 
ministries.24 In 2003, the public council was established at the Ministry of 
Justice. In 2005, the Public Chamber of the Russian Federation was founded 
with proclaimed aim “to analyze draft legislation and the activities of the 
parliament, as well as to monitor federal and regional administrative bodies.” 
Representatives of many human rights NGOs became active members of 
these new organizations. Although new public councils and chambers are 
heavily criticized by many pessimists as a pale imitation of democratic 
practices, they, at the same time, are seen by optimists as promising 
institutionalization of (human rights) NGOs’ involvement in policy-making. It is 
also important to mention that since 2006 the Public Chamber has run 
                                            
23 The initiative to establish “a Russian human rights organization for monitoring the 
observance of freedom of speech and the fundamental human rights in the United States, 
Europe, and other Western nations” was announced in the beginning of 2007 by Anatoly 
Kucherena, Public Chamber member. Recently, on EU-Russia Marfa summit, President Putin 
has revealed plans to  set up a non-governmental institute of freedom and democracy in one 
of Europe’s capitals, possibly in Brussels. See RB-Ru Daily, 28 October 2007, available at 
http://www.rb.ru/topstory/politics/2007/10/28/153604.html. 
24 According to the List of Public Chambers available at the website of the Public Chamber of 
the Russian Federation, there are 20 public chambers operating in Russian regions.  
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competitions for the so-called presidential grants and thus has become 
involved into managing new rounds of grand-based NGOs activities. For 
2008, approximately € 35 million 200 thousand will be granted to Russian 
NGOs, including approximately € 3 million 800 thousand to be used in NGO-
run projects in the area of human rights25. 
Second, President Putin made criminal procedure reform a clear priority of 
his first administration. Because problems with criminal procedure lay at the 
heart of some of Russia’s worst human rights violations, the passage of the 
new Criminal Procedure Code in 2001 represented an important advance.26 
The passage of the code and an effort by the Russian government in the 
years after 2001 to ensure the code would be put in practice created window 
of opportunity for many actors, including human rights NGOs, to carry human 
rights norms and values into the Russia policy-making process. Drafting and 
implementing new legislation continue to be on the Russian political agenda, 
and this creates opportunities for NGOs to reach those from various 
professional groups who seek change in specific areas of policy regarding 
human rights issues. Certainly, bureaucratically driven process of legal 
reforms may be too selective, slow or constrained by political consideration. 
Yet, it may provide those who involved in policy-making with incentives to 
deepen their understating of human rights issues and those from NGOs with 
opportunities to communicate their ideas and foster formal and informal 
channels of access to policy-making process. 
In sum, human rights NGOs have a chance of capturing a space in state-
dominated policy-networks although to do this they have to solve a two-level 
puzzle. The two levels of this puzzle are as follows: the first is the highly-
politicized approach to human rights issues shared by many high-level 
Russian politicians (often with “own Russia way” argument as part of their 
diplomatic and political style). It is on this level where criticism on human 
rights situation in Russia as whole and Chechnya in particular is rejected and 
the Western assistance to human rights NGOs is seen as attempts to impose 
on Russia alien values and models of political development. The second level 
                                            
25 Kommersant 204, 07.11.2007. 
26 Matthew Spence, “The Complexity of Success: the U.S. Role in Russian Rule of Law 
Reform”, Carnegie Paper, no. 60, July 2005.  
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is marked by less-politicized approach shared by those professionals within 
governmental agencies who are involved in more technical aspects of 
planning and implementing legal reforms and thus demonstrate more 
readiness to replicate many parts of European policies which they consider as 
appropriate and effective for Russia. While the first approach is easily 
noticeable in numerous speeches and public statements of Russian 
politicians27, the strength of the second one is not so obvious for outside 
observer but, nevertheless, should not be underestimated.  And a key 
practical issue for human rights non-governmental actors is how to broaden 
their access to sympathetic bureaucrats and politicians, how to act as a 
trigger for more social learning in government, and how to make NGOs’ 
advice and expertise accepted as valid and useful by decision-making elites.  
Russian human rights NGOs community is large, vibrant, deeply-
networked and diverse, though it develops in a controversial legal and 
normative environment and currently faces many serious challenges. One 
challenge which Russian human rights NGOs face today is to reframe the 
problems they are trying to solve, to deepen understanding of their activities in 
public opinion and the mass-media, and to build connections with ordinary 
Russians. Another crucial challenge for Russian human rights NGOs is to 
build cooperative engagement with government and capture a space in state-
dominated policy-networks. Certainly, possible answers to these challenges 
from Russian NGOs will be in large part shaped by Russian domestic 
landscapes. Yet, to date foreign assistance employed to promote human 
rights in Russia has also been an important factor influencing the relationship 
between the state, Russian NGOs, and the public in the field of human rights. 
The crucial question here is if and how EU’s human rights promotion activities 
fits this policy area. 
 
 
                                            
27 For instance, President Putin recently confessed once again that, in his view, criticism 
pointing to violations of human rights in Russia “ is largely used as an instrument to influence 
political life inside Russia and as an instrument that helps some state to achieve its foreign 
policy goals in relation to Russia with the help of this kind of demagogy.” Interfax, February 
10, 2007. 
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2. EU’s assistance to Russian human rights 
NGOs: mechanisms and results 
The EU’s Russia policy as regards human rights has been shaped not only by 
the EU interpretations of Russia’s political and human rights situation but also 
by the Community’s desire to present itself externally as a devoted guardian 
of human rights. During the last decade the EU has gradually strengthen its 
rhetorical commitment and its financial instruments to assist human rights 
promotion around the world.  
The willingness of the EU to develop a human rights policy was not 
apparent till the early 1970s. Yet, once the European Court of Justice (ECJ) 
and the other Community institutions have established that respect for human 
rights was a part of the general principles of European Law (from 1969 
onwards), the discourse of human rights began to infiltrate the EU rhetoric 
and projects. It took another twenty years for the Community to start 
consolidating a human rights policy towards third states. Then, amidst the 
euphoria induced by the end of the Cold War, the Community rushed to 
present human rights as an essential element both of the Community and the 
European model that it upheld. Human rights became more and more 
apparent in negotiations and agreements between the EU and the newly 
emerging democracies in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). By the mid-
1990s, the Commission began to be explicit in suggesting that respect for 
human rights should be among the key conditions attached to the “Europe 
Agreements” to be signed with those CEE countries that were seeking 
accession to the European Union.  
It was in this context that the EU developed its policy towards Russia and 
drafted the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) between the 
European Union and the Russian Federation. The long text of the PCA was 
based on the EU’s conception of how its neighborhood relations should be 
organized and became a weak derivative of the “Europe Agreements”. The 
first principle of the PCA, signed between the Russian Federation and the 
European Communities and their member states in 1994, declares that 
“convinced of the paramount importance of the rule of law and respect for 
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human rights, particularly those of minorities, the establishment of a multiparty 
system with free and democratic elections and economic liberalization aimed 
at setting up a market economy”. The EU and Russia have agreed that 
“respect for democratic principles and human rights as defined in particular in 
the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris for New a New Europe, 
underpins the internal and external policies of the Parties and constitutes an 
essential element of partnership and of this agreement”. The PCA relationship 
was designed as one of soft political coordination rather than one of strict 
conditionality. The EU has led Russia to admit that human rights matters 
should be included into the EU-Russia cooperation agenda, but didn’t try to 
use a window of opportunity open in the mid-1990s to push forward a more 
legally binding deal with Russia regarding human rights.  
Further events clearly demonstrate that cooperation and partnership 
between the parties suffer in large part from the continuing and even 
sharpening divergences between the EU and Russia. These divergences go 
to the fundamentals of the self-identification of both the EU and Russia and to 
their views of each other’s will and ability to engage seriously in human rights 
matters. While the EU has constantly stressed its commitment to serve as one 
of principal guardian of human rights on the Euro-Asian continent, the 
Russian side questions the EU ability to build-up a pan-European human 
rights regime, and the very necessity of such attempts given the existence of 
the Council of Europe. While the EU criticizes Russia for its bad human rights 
record, the Russian side questions if the actual policy of the EU matches its 
fine words and rhetoric on matters of human rights.  
Within Russia the debate grows. On the one hand, Russian political 
leaders constantly argue that modern Russian-ness is deeply embedded in 
European-ness, and Russia shares with the European Union the values of 
democracy, good governance, and human rights. Culturally and politically, 
they say, Russia belongs to Europe; Russians value human rights as high as 
other Europeans do; and Russia’s partnership with the European Union has 
been expression and recognition of Russia’s European identity. At the same 
time, arguments are raised that Russia constitutes a distinctive part of 
European civilization. And rather than ape EU values, Russia should break its 
ideological dependence on western theories, articulate its own unique values 
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and defend the “Russian version” of human rights, models of democracy and 
path to it, as well as the Russian way to good and effective governance. This 
line of argumentation leads to claims that the European Union has not always 
been equitable, as it “employs” double standards in assessing the human 
rights situation in Russia and trying to impose on the country alien values and 
governance models on the tacit understanding that, unlike EU member states, 
Russia requires constant scrutiny, shaming and the presence of potential 
negative measures to ensure human rights are respected. Against this 
background, it is not surprising that Russia has resisted EU proposals to 
spend more time and space for human rights-related issues within the Four 
Common Spaces Agreement.  
Within the EU debate grows as well. Some European decision-makers, 
concerned by the worsening human rights situation in Russia which is 
constantly reported by human rights NGOs, strain to put human rights at the 
head of the EU-Russia agenda and advocate the inclusion of appropriate 
clauses in the new PCA (that, in their view, will bind the Kremlin to abide by 
international human rights legislation). Others show much less eagerness to 
subordinate other key issues in the EU-Russian relationship to criticism of 
Russia’s domestic situation and seem to be ready to sign “sectoral 
agreements” that will ensure trade, transport, energy and investments links 
with Russia at the expense of insisting on “problematic” clauses about human 
rights and rule of law. Many within the EU are concerned about the values 
gap between the EU and Russia and raise the question on how far the EU 
should go in deepening the declared “strategic partnership” with Russia when 
the human rights values gap between the parties is widening. These are also 
questions about how to bridge the gap between the EU high ambitions to 
converge Russia on European values and its relatively limited achievements 
in this filed. In this context, a key practical issue is if and how to reform the EU 
human rights policy and rule-of-law assistance to Russia.  
To date, the EU has developed a complicated mixture of human rights 
policy instruments (see Table 2) as well as an ambitious external governance 
agenda which seems to be in large part about the transfer of EU visions and 
practices to its new neighbors. This agenda has been fundamentally shaped 
by the belief that the EU can act as a “norm-sender”, i.e. can succeed in 
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getting its neighbors to conform to its norms and rules and thus trigger policy 
changes in the new\EU neighborhood. The EU external agenda employs 
symbolic, material, and institutional means of influence and several strategies 
for promoting protection of human rights by EU’s neighbors, including: 
Shaming = creating an international and domestic climate of opinion 
critical of national human rights practices;  
Positive / negative conditionality = offer or withdrawal of assistance, trade 
agreements, association agreements, and the promises of potential EU 
membership as a reaction to neighbor’s human rights behavior;  
Cooptation = gradual and limited involvement of policy actors from 
neighboring states in EU policy-making process, in such a way as to trigger 
their behavioral adaptation and social learning.   
For the topic at hand it is important to stress that the EU proclaims its 
eagerness to introduce the non-governmental element into its policies. From a 
more theoretical perspective, the supportive conceptual framework informing 
EU’s human rights promotion policy seems to draw inspirations from at least 
the two theories: liberalism and constructivism. The EU’s policy presupposes 
the existence of non-state actors that can be motivated to pressure the 
government for compliance with human rights norms (as liberals would argue) 
or (as constructivists would argue) can become agents in “Europeanization-
by-socialization” process which in due course would see Russian society and 
government convergence on human rights values28. From a policy 
perspective, it is important that both approached merge/overlap on 
conceptualizing NGOs as influential agents for policy change. Against this 
background it is not surprising that NGOs involvement into human rights 
policy-making has become an obsession of the EU policy makers in the past 
decade.  
 
 
 
 
                                            
28
 For more on theoretical discussions see Hans Peter Schmitz and Kathryn Sikkink, 
International Relations Theory and Human Rights. 
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Table 2: 
EU’s human rights policy: instruments 
 
 Diplomatic pressure in response to violation of human rights (through 
confidential or public demarches, joint statements, refusal to act on 
partner’s initiatives, deferment of signatures needed to implement 
agreements); human rights dialogues and consultations can also be used 
as a form of diplomatic pressure; 
 Scrutiny (monitoring) which is effectively designed and functions with 
various sources of information used (reports by Commission’s delegations 
and the relevant embassies of the Eu member-states; assessment from 
international organizations including the Council of Europe; reports by 
international and local NGOs); 
 Negative measures which include a number of graded responses to 
violation of human rights by third states (postponement of new projects; 
reduction of cultural, scientific or technical cooperation programs; trade 
embargoes; suspension of cooperation with the state concerned); 
 Positive measures which have been considered an essential element 
of the external human rights policy and include technical and financial 
assistance programs (such as the PHARE, the TACIS, and recently the 
ENPI) and the EIDHR that grant financial assistance to non-governmental 
actors worldwide.   
 
 
The crucial importance of NGOs for human rights and democracy promotion 
has become acknowledged in EU official texts, and the idea of promoting 
human rights in Russia through the development of Russian human rights 
NGOs have become embedded in EU policy discourses. Thus, at the 
rhetorical level the support to Russian human rights organizations has 
become an integral part of the working agenda by which Brussels has set 
about bringing European norms and values to Russia. In practice, the EU’s 
commitments include: maintaining and encouraging dialogue between EU 
institutions and Russian human rights NGOs; promoting active NGOs 
involvement in certain human rights practices (in particular, monitoring and 
consultations); ensuring access to funding resources; helping organisations to 
establish links outside their own country and giving a higher profile to the 
sector. 
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(1) The EU practice of monitoring and reporting human rights situations in 
third countries involves a large part of information sharing between the EU 
institutions and local human rights NGOs. Russian NGOs have become an 
important source of information and expertise concerning the human rights 
situation in the Russian Federation. Information, provided by NGOs, is used in 
preparing EU missions’ annual human rights “fact sheets”, EU Annual Human 
Rights Reports, and background papers for discussions and hearings at the 
EU institutions. In some cases, it is the initiative by Russian NGOs to bring the 
actual cases of human rights abuses to the attention of the Commission’s 
directorates and the Delegation in Moscow.29 In other cases, rather than 
waiting for information from local organizations, the Directorates General and 
European Parliament may commission Russian NGOs to prepare reports on 
human rights situation in the country. By doing this, EU policy makers not only 
get information on the issue but, at the same time, establish NGO’s reputation 
as an effective watchdog and as a valuable source of expertise.  
In sum, involvement of Russian NGOs in the EU practice of human rights 
monitoring is effectively designed and functioned. Many Russian human rights 
NGOs clearly demonstrate their ability to act as watchdogs critically 
monitoring the activities of Russian state agencies. Yet, it is important to note 
that those organizations involved in scrutiny activities initiated by external 
actors usually face serious difficulties when trying to build trust and 
partnership relations with domestic governmental agencies. Thus, active 
involvement in EU human rights monitoring may seriously restrict the ability of 
an NGO to build positive relationship with state actors and to socialize them 
into EU-sponsored human rights ideas. This is quite well illustrated by the 
dynamics of EU-Russia human rights consultations. 
 
(2) The EU seems to start making serious efforts to bring human rights 
NGOs into the dialogue which EU and Russian officials have over human 
rights issues. In 2006, the EU proposed changes to the design of the EU-
Russia human rights consultations, namely to broaden the list of participants 
                                            
29 The channels of communication between Russian human rights NGOs and the Commission 
are so well developed, that it may take less then two hours to report a case of human rights 
abuse happened in any Russian region to the Commission offices in Brussels. 
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from Russian ministries. The other proposal for Russian officials was to take 
part in additional, less formal days of consultations during which human rights 
issues are discussed with representatives of international and Russian NGOs. 
Until now, this initiative has not yet been realized in large part because 
Russian officials insist to keep these talks “conventional and professional” and 
claim to use them as an opportunity to discuss sensitive issues with their 
European colleagues – directly and constructively, but not for the press or 
watch-dogging NGOs.  
At the time of writing, it is clear that the consultations are seen as 
unsatisfactory by all parties involved. In the EU view, the consultations 
continues to be important, as they help to keep the channel of communication 
with regard to human rights open, but, at the same time, they seems to be 
ineffective and reduced to repeating the same message year after year. 
Representatives of Russian NGOs argue that the consultations have reached 
a dead end, in large part because EU representatives, Russian officials and 
international and Russian NGOs have so far failed to hold joint talks.30 In 
Russian official view, the effectiveness of EU-Russia human rights 
consultations is seriously undermined by the incoherence between the EU’s 
internal and external human rights practices: human rights issues acquire a 
much more significant presence in EU’s Russia policy than they do internally. 
The EU has developed a well-functioned structure of human rights scrutiny for 
external cases, including Russian, but still lacks any systemic approach to 
address human rights problems within the EU.31  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
30 RFL/RL, October 3, 2007, http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2007/10/D264D180-8A70-
4CC6-92E1-A0B0894184D1.html 
31
 Authors’ interview with Mikhail Evdokimov, 16 February, 2007.  
CENTER FOR POLICY STUDIES/INTERNATIONAL POLICY FELLOWSHIPS 2006/07 
 29 
EU Human Rights Dialogues / Consultations 
 
EU Human Rights Dialogues (HRD) – is a new type of human rights 
policy instrument used by the EU. Formal HRD was installed by the EU as a 
reaction to the UN Commission on Human Rights’ inability to address serious 
and well-documented violations of human rights in China. The EU’s first 
institutionalized HRD was initiated with China; HRD was then maintained with 
Iran. More recently dialogues with Central Asian countries (Uzbekistan, 
Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan) have been initiated. In addition, 
HRD are conducted with Egypt, Morocco, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, and 
Tunisia in the context of EU-ENP relations. 
The EU guidelines on HRD were developed and adopted in 2001 and 
then slightly revised in 2004. The main aims of the HRD are (1) to improve the 
human rights situation in the country with which the dialogue is initiated and 
(2) to keep the channel of communication with regard to human rights open. 
Results of HRD are yet to be evaluated, and Committee on Foreign Affairs – 
Subcommittee on Human Rights of the European Parliament is currently in 
the process of preparing a report on the functioning of the HRDs.  
Russia became the third country, after China and Iran, with which 
bilateral discussions on human rights were organized. It was agreed at the 
November 2004 EU-Russia summit that the EU and Russia will have Human 
Rights Consultations twice a year at the level of senior officials. (The term 
“dialogue” was refused to be used by Russian officials as they did reject the 
idea of being put into the same category as China and Iran).  Russia is 
represented by officials from the Department of Humanitarian Co-operation 
and Human Rights of the Russian Ministry for Foreign Affairs; and the 
European Union by officials from the Presidency of the EU (current and 
forthcoming), the European Commission, and the Council of the EU. To date, 
there have been 6 rounds of the EU-Russia Human Rights Consultations (with 
the most recent being held in October 2007) that have addressed a wide 
range of issues. As these consultations are claimed to be held on a 
“reciprocal basis”, their agenda include discussions on the situation with 
human rights and fundamental freedoms not only in Russia, but also in the EU 
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and worldwide. Facing constant difficulties in drafting a joint press release, the 
Russian and the EU sides issue separate press releases summarizing 
discussion during the Consultations. 
 
 
(3) The EU has spent and continues to spend considerable financial 
resources aimed to assist NGOs through a complicated mixture of various 
programs and projects. And the EU assistance to Russia, including civil 
society assistance, has been embedded in and shaped by the larger 
institutional landscape of EU foreign aid. 
For more than a decade, the main instrument of EU assistance to Russia 
had been the TACIS program32 that was launched to provide grant-financed 
technical assistance to support the transition of Russia (and all other former 
Soviet Republics with the exception of the three Baltic states) toward a market 
economy, democracy, and the rule of law. During the period from 1991 to 
2005, Russia had been the biggest beneficiary of EU support to the countries 
in the post-Soviet region: it has received € 2.7 billion, which constituted about 
half of all TACIS funding33. Human rights promotion and assistance to those 
actors involved in fostering the rule of law in Russia were proclaimed as one 
of TACIS priorities.34 The EU implemented a number of TACIS-based focused 
programs primarily designed to support civil society in Russia. They include 
LIEN (Link Inter European NGOs) Program and its successor IBPP 
                                            
32
 The TACIS in the last year of its existence was known as EU-Russia Cooperation Program. 
33
 This money was used in 1500 projects in 58 Russian regions (a proportion of which was 
channeled through or granted to NGOs. TACIS was based on project-management approach, 
with projects proposed either by the Commission or by delegates of the member states. Once 
a project is adopted, a call for tender follows to solicit proposals on how to implement the 
project. A call for tender normally included both general and specific objectives and a 
description of eligible costs. Applicants were normally given either 60 or 90 days to respond to 
the call and submit the full application including proof of eligibility documentation and a 
detailed budget.  From those tenders which successfully met the deadline and submitted all 
required documentation, the final project partner was selected by the European Commission. 
34
 The “Country Strategy Paper 2002-2006 on Russia”, adopted by the European Commission 
within the TACIS framework, stipulated that “the EU cooperation objective with the Russian 
Federation are to foster respect of democratic principles and human rights, as well as 
transition towards a market economy”. 
Since 2000 the TACIS national programs had three priority areas for each target countries. 
The last TACIS regulation, which covered the years 2000 to 2006, identified the following 
priorities for Russia: support for institutional, legal and administrative reform, support to the 
private sector and assistance for economic development, support for addressing the social 
consequences of transition.   
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(Institutional Building Partnership Program) which aimed to interlink Russian 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and local/regional authorities with 
their EU counterparts35. Although it is often stated by EU officials that Russian 
NGOs constituted the large proportion of those organizations selected as 
TACIS project partners, at the time of writing no complete data on TACIS 
financial aid to NGOs are available.  
From the very beginning, the process of offering EU assistance was 
confusing particularly in relation to the financing and choice of projects. But in 
1994 many resources were grouped together under one budgetary heading 
entitled the “European Initiative for Democracy and the Protection of Human 
Rights” (EIDHR)36. The EIDHR has more thematic approach, offering 
assistance to NGOs active in the areas of democratization and human rights. 
It is important to note that the EIDHR, created by an initiative of the European 
Parliament, is unique among EU programs because it does not require host 
government consent and offers assistance for only NGOs based in recipient 
country, in our case, in Russia.37 It means that the EIDHR can enable the EU 
to develop civil society support to some (albeit modest) degree in opposition 
to governments.  Moreover, some European politicians see the EIDPR as 
unique among other EU human rights and democracy assistance programs 
since it is “the single mechanism left for the EU to influence Russian human 
rights situation as all other purely democratic projects have turned to be 
almost totally fruitless”.38 
Since its launch in Russia in 1997, the EIDHR has supported over 250 
projects. During the period from 1997 to 2000, the EIDHR has assisted 
Russia with approximately € 8 million for projects covering a wide range of the 
policy objectives of the EU policies, including raising human rights awareness. 
The overall indicative amount available for Russia under the 2005 Call for 
proposals was € 870 thousand. For 2005, the European Commission received 
                                            
35
 During the period from 2001 to 2005, the IBPP-CS programme budget has totalled € 28 
million and 135 projects have been supported.  
36 It was renamed the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) in 
December 2006. 
37 In contrast to the EIDHR, all assistance under Tacis is dependent on the approval of the 
recipient countries’ government.  
38 Edward McMillan-Scott’s speech at the EU-Russia Center Public Hearing held at the 
European Parliament, Brussels, 22 November, 2006.  
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94 applications and selected 11 Russia-based micro-projects for funding. For 
2007, 15 Russia-based micro-projects will be assisted with approximately € 1 
million 450 thousands.39 According to Country Strategy Paper on Russia 
(2007-2013), the EIDHR will remain to be an EU financial instrument to 
support enhancing respect for human rights and bolstering the role of civil 
society in the promotion of human rights in Russia. Grant funding will be 
provided to national and international NGOs and international organizations, 
including certain UN bodies.   
Since January 2007, the European Neighborhood and Partnership 
Instrument (ENPI), linked up to the European Neighborhood Program (ENP), 
has become the principal new tool for providing assistance to EU neighboring 
countries. This instrument has been designed to finance the activities which 
that previously fallen under TACIS budgetary lines. The ENPI will be the EU 
main financial instrument for supporting the implementation of the partnership 
with Russia. External assistance under the ENPI is subject to a multi-annual 
programming circle. Every six years the EC drafts Country Strategy Papers, 
which elaborate the assistance priorities for the following six years. In spring 
2007, the Strategy Papers for the years 2007-2013 were released. According 
to them, the national allocation for Russia will amount € 30 million per annum 
(that is, less than half the average annual allocation to Russia in recent years 
under the TACIS program).40  Certain proportions of the national allocation will 
be dedicated to support of actions mentioned in the Four Common Spaces, to 
the development of the North Caucasus and Kaliningrad region, and to 
compliment so-called Russian “national projects”.  Although it is mentioned in 
the Country Strategy Paper that human rights matters will be taken into 
account by the Delegation in Moscow while designing financial for Russia-
based projects, the amount of human rights assistance to Russia under ENPI 
is not clear yet.  
                                            
39 http://www.delrus.ec.europa.eu/ru/docs/award_notice1.pdf 
40 EU Country Strategy Paper (2007-2013): Russian Federation, 
http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/russia/csp/2007-2013_en.pdf/. For the budgetary period 
2007-2010 Russia national allocation will be  € 120 million, Georgian -   € 120 million; 
Moldovan -   € 209,7 million; Ukrainian - € 494 million.  
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The above described changes in EU assistance to Russia are certainly 
part of the broader reform, recently launched to replace a complicated mixture 
of various external assistance programs by a single, more effective and 
policy-oriented instrument, the ENPI. At the same time, they are certainly 
shaped by the dynamics of EU-Russia relations. It is appears that previous 
assistance programs in large part failed to contribute to radical improvements 
of EU-Russian relations, at least with regard to human rights. The growing 
debate within the EU and dramatic reduction of EU assistance to Russia, 
planned for the budgetary period 2007-2010, can both be seen as a signal 
that EU policy makers are dissatisfied with the result of Russia-oriented 
programs implemented before 2007.  It is also important to note that a number 
of interviewees in Russian NGOs and governmental agencies confirmed that 
EU assistance to Russian NGOs can hardly be considered a success story.  
The impact of foreign assistance on Russian NGO development has been 
hotly disputed by policy analysts. Some argue that foreign funding have 
fundamentally shaped and even created Russian NGO community, while 
others insist that it has limited effect on NGOs. I support the argument that 
foreign assistance almost always has an impact on the NGO sector it 
supports, but the results of this influence depends in large part on how this 
assistance has been managed as well as on the kind of broader strategies it 
is built in41. 
Certainly, it would be a mistake to easily dismiss the importance of EU 
assistance programs to Russian NGOs. The very existence of such programs 
encourages and facilitates the activities of those NGOs that aim to introduce 
European values, norms, and practices into Russian policy-making. To some 
extent it is true that “the EU may not act – in a conventional sense of this word 
– but in the meantime exercise influence by the virtue of its ontological 
existence, its very presence, even without taking particular actions… The EU 
subjectivity is manifested, to a large extent, through a force of example”.42  
                                            
41 Lisa McIntosh Sundstrom, “Foreign Assistance, International Norms, and NGO 
Development: Lessons from the Russian Campaign”, International Organizations 59, Spring 
2005, p. 421. 
42 Andrey Makarychev, “Subjects vs. Structures: Conceptual Interrogations of the EU 
Pathways of Influence upon Russia”, Promoting Four Freedoms and Four Spaces in the Baltic 
Sea Region, Research Bulletin no. 2, 2006, pp. 9-10.  
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For many Russian human rights NGOs EU assistance provides additional 
but very important opportunities to have access to Europe-wide policy 
networks and to aggregate transnational (European) knowledge and 
competence. EU-sponsored initiatives provide both a rational and an 
opportunity for NGO actors to come into contact with their EU counterparts, 
share with them common vocabularies, world views, and become involved in 
professional knowledge and skills transfers. Thus, opportunities that EU 
assistance offers Russian NGOs include at least three important factors: 
knowledge, network connections, and funding.  
However, EU policies of human rights NGOs assistance often failed in 
practice to realize their full potential to develop non-state transfer of European 
ideas, norms and practices to Russia and to assist successful development of 
Russian NGOs community. 
The EU external assistance policy contains many problems that limit their 
ability to: 
 
First, one important shortcoming of the EU policies is the fact that EU 
policy-makers, all rhetoric notwithstanding, have yet to decide how important 
their support to Russian NGOs should be and in what respect. While NGOs 
are addressed through EU different programs, there seems to be no clear 
strategy or prioritization of assistance in different issue-areas. At present, EU 
assistance to Russian NGOs represents more ad-hoc project-based financing 
rather than a coherent policy of building NGOs’ capacity to extend the reach 
of Europeanization into Russia. 
Second, the EU has been reforming its external assistance for years, and 
the reforms have so far produced controversial results. Driven by important 
and valid concerns over financial accountability and effectiveness, the EU has 
been using the financial regulation that imply financial control that stricter that 
usual standards in both public and private sectors.43 Consequently, EU 
assistance has not been easily accessible to local non-state actors, given the 
complexity of the application and reporting requirements, requiring expert 
                                            
43 K. Raik, “Promoting Democracy through Civil Society: How to Step Up the EU’s Policy 
towards the Eastern Neighborhood”, CEPS Working Document, No. 237 / February 2006.  
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knowledge of EC systems. Grants are repeatedly given to those organizations 
that had proven their ability to follow procedures and reporting requirements 
established by the EU, while newer, smaller NGOs with short grant history are 
often left without funds. The other problem is that EU policies and practices 
often lead both to self-censorship among NGOs and greater conservatism 
from EU officials. Organizations that are able to communicate referring to the 
language and agenda current among EU policy makers are more likely to be 
successful in their grant applications. As a result, quite often grants are 
awarded to those organizations which have learned EU bureaucratic 
language and agenda well rather than to those NGOs which are ready to 
experiment with innovative projects and eager to find new ways to 
transformation change in sensitive political contexts.  
Third, although the current EU human rights assistance programs are 
expanding in Russia, there is still lack of accumulated knowledge about 
“lessons learned” by both EU policy-makers and human rights NGOs. 
Although NGOs do have to present official reports as evidence that they are 
taking seriously the need to reflect on their own work, very often these reports 
are purely descriptive rather than analytical and strategic. Remarkably little 
writing has come out from human rights policy community about the 
experience accommodated by Russian NGOs in the field of bringing human 
rights norms and practices to Russia.  
Fourth, it is crucially important to note that the kind of interactions that the 
EU wants with Russian policy-makers and Russian non-state actors over 
human rights is far from obvious for many in Russia. Many Russians seem to 
lack a clear understanding of what they can get from a multitude of EU-
sponsored projects implemented by Russian human rights NGOs. This can be 
partly explained by little media attention to the positive measures used in EU’s 
Russia human rights policy. EU criticism of Russia’s human rights situation 
has usually attracted a lot of media coverage. Yet, information on what the EU 
and NGOs have been doing in addition to critically monitoring the Russian 
state is difficult to find in the mass media. It can be partly explained by the fact 
that there is a serious lack of timely and easily accessible information about 
this policy and EU-sponsored projects implemented in Russia.  
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In the broader field of human rights assistance, the puzzle has been for 
both the EU and human rights NGOs to translate the overarching idea of 
human rights into a series of clear and appealing messages they can 
communicate to decision-makers and general public. At more basic level, the 
challenge has been for both the EU and human rights NGOs to develop 
effective communication strategy to disseminate timely and valuable 
information about EU-sponsored projects implemented in Russia.  
 
3. What is to be done? 
 
The European Union can doubtless keep the formal dialogue with Russia over 
human rights going by continuing its current Russia’s policy. Yet, the result of 
this formal, modest and fragmentary dialogue is very likely to be disappointing 
to both parties. If the EU is to develop as a serious actor in the field of human 
rights promotion, it will have to find new and creative ways to talk with 
Russians about human rights matters.  
At a strategic level, EU policy-makers should answer several crucial 
questions on if and how to re-design EU existing strategies for promoting 
protection of human rights by Russia. First, how much emphasis should be 
place on shaming given that all EU efforts to shame the Russian government 
appears to have been unsuccessful? Shaming always requires the active 
support of domestic, in our case Russian, public. To date, EU shaming 
strategies have succeeded in creating an international climate of opinion 
critical of Russian human rights behavior but failed to undermine the Russian 
government’s reputation at home. Moreover, EU shaming strategy, not yet 
resulted in major policy victories, has tended to increase the detachment from 
the wider Russian population of those human rights NGOs that are involved in 
shaming and monitoring. Second, how effectively positive/negative 
conditionality can be used with regards to the country which is voluntarily 
distancing itself from the EU and, at the same time, with which the EU seems 
to be in great interdependence? At the moment, there is little evidence from 
Russia that positive or negative conditionality in support of human rights are 
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effective. Moreover, for many in Russia the credibility of human rights 
conditionality has been undermined because of widely-accepted views that 
conditionality measures taken by the EU with regard to Russia are not always 
guided by objective and equitable criteria. Third, how successfully cooptation 
strategy can be employed given that Russia has refused to be part of the ENP 
and has resisted EU proposals to put more emphasis on human rights matters 
within the Four Common Spaces Agreement? The problem is that, from the 
Russian point of view, such a strategy is unacceptable unless Russia gains a 
say in designing EU policies and that, from the EU point of view, non-
members cannot be part of EU internal decision-making.  
The strategies for human rights promotion employed by the EU seem to be 
ill-adapted to the current context of the EU-Russia relationship. These 
strategies are largely designed as an experimental weak derivative of the 
policy developed in the course of  the EU enlargement and are based on the 
belief that the EU acts as a magnet, leading to revolutionary policy changes in 
neighboring countries, as evidenced by Central and Eastern Europe in 
the1990s. EU policy-makers has often commended the enlargement policy as 
well as the role played by NGOs in human rights promotion in Central and 
Eastern Europe, and constantly professed themselves as eager to duplicate 
this experience elsewhere. However, this success may be difficult to replicate 
since the contemporary situation in Russia is very different from that of the 
early-1990s Central and Eastern Europe. In contrast to the latter, neither the 
majority of Russian policy-makers nor broad sectors of Russia are convinced 
about the benefits of the policies offered and models espoused by the EU. 
Therefore, it would be a serious mistake to expect that “EUropeaness” would 
be brought rather quickly to Russia in the same way it had to other 
neighboring countries.  
 
Russia puts the EU’s policy to the test, as demonstrated by the lack of real 
progress in the ongoing dialogue between the two parties. This situation 
demands a far-reaching rethink of the approach the EU takes to human rights 
promotion: either the EU’s existing policy will be restructured to meet new 
challenges or Russia will continue to limit EU-Russia cooperation over human 
rights.  
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In response to this situation, the EU may adopt a three-fold policy. The EU 
should put aside unrealistic expectations about speedy policy change in 
Russia. Successful way to foster human rights in the country should be 
extended through slow process, and the EU does not need to rush to change 
the Russian views. Strongly pressuring actors from inside and outside the 
government to commit themselves to EU understanding of human rights 
before they are ready to accept it voluntarily is to invite disappointments and 
open non-compliance. Second, the EU should put more focus on engaging 
with Russia through other multilateral organizations that share a broadly 
common vision of human rights. While it is difficult to develop the direct 
dialogue between the EU and Russia over human rights, there are still 
opportunities to use other existing dialogues and human rights regimes in 
which Russia has been involved. It is important to foster a sense of Russia’s 
belonging to pan-European milieu where human rights norms, values and 
practices are shared. Here the particular concern should be on making use of 
those mechanisms and commitments that Russia has entered into and taken 
within the framework of Council of Europe. Considerable part of EU’s support 
for Russian human rights NGOs could also be channeled trough Council of 
Europe (See Annex 1). Third, it is important to continue (and increase) EU 
assistance to Russian civil society organizations in the field of human rights 
and the rule of law promotion. To date, the EU has largely escaped the 
opprobrium attracted by many other Western donors and could use its 
comparatively neutral image to continue support for those Russian actors who 
have been trying to push forward human rights related projects. Yet, there is a 
strong need for improving the quality of the EU assistance. 
 
At an operational level, EU policy-makers should answer the question on how 
to tailor large budget lines and complicated mixture of assistance programs 
and instruments for the Russian context. Derived from the analysis of current 
practices, the following steps are recommended:  
 
 
 
CENTER FOR POLICY STUDIES/INTERNATIONAL POLICY FELLOWSHIPS 2006/07 
 39 
 Develop new forms of cooperation between various EU 
institutions and actors and Russian NGOs.  
 
This would require not only consultations with individuals representing 
Russian NGO community, not only support for various NGO-led projects, but 
also the consistent involvement of civil society organizations into discussing 
and preparing new partnership agreements between the EU and Russia. 
Cooperation between EU policy-makers and Russian NGOs should not limit 
itself to the modest input of information from NGOs on human rights situation 
in the country and from the EU on new European initiatives and tenders. It is 
important to ensure regular input from Russian actors into the design and 
implementation of human rights assistance programs and other EU initiatives 
addressing the issues of human rights in Russia. Russian policy analysts 
could be encouraged to provide independent assessments of projects 
success, to submit reports on the extent of EU support for human rights in 
Russia, and to produce human rights and the rule of law strategy papers. This 
would ensure that EU-sponsored initiatives and projects would be more tailor-
made for Russia. 
 
 Develop and implement effective public communication 
strategies 
 
To date, the striking aspect of the EU policy is the limited amount of effort so 
far devoted to reaching the Russian public and raising the visibility of EU 
human rights projects. Perhaps it is partially the result of the highly 
bureaucratized nature of EU policy towards Russia and the role of Brussels 
bureaucrats as the principal intermediaries between Russia and the EU. 
Almost never do EU officials share with the Russian public or even the 
broader elite their hopes and aims of their concerns and misgivings. But if the 
EU is serious about taking a greater role in human rights promotion, it should 
develop its public diplomacy capabilities and consider how better to speak 
and to listen to Russian public.  
 
• It is important for the EU to become increasingly sophisticated in 
forming the messages to the Russian public (and to the state) 
regarding human rights observance. The ability to frame human rights 
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issues in terms appealing to the Russians would help to build public 
awareness and change the ways human rights and human rights 
NGOs are seen and treated. At the moment, the EU actors collectively 
and in key bilateral contacts have challenged what they see as Russian 
excesses in Chechnya and the Russian way from democracy. But 
neither EU’s concerns over Chechnya not its worry over the lack of 
democracy in Russia have been much helped. Had the harsh criticism 
over, human rights issues been framed in ways more well understood 
in public opinion, the dialogue of the EU and the Russian public might 
have been more effective. Because of the Russian normative context 
discussed above, the ability to frame problems in terms of economic 
and personal rights are more likely to raise public awareness and 
support to human rights NGOs.  
 
• It is important to increase support for the public diplomacy and 
communications activities of the EU delegation to Russia. At the 
moment, the Moscow delegation seems to work hard to make the 
delegation’s website more user-friendly and raise the public profile of 
the EIDHR, but much remains to be done. There is great need for 
timely, more detailed and user-friendly information in Russian about 
projects and programs supported and run by the delegation.  
 
• It is important to develop and harmonize communications activities of 
NGOs - recipients of the EU support (including strategic 
communications planning and coordination, better research and 
feedback, increasing the projects’ profile, and better use of multimedia 
and internet tools). It would be useful if human rights projects 
supported by the EU would have a proportional budget for 
communications and media outreach activities. NGOs must be 
encouraged to reach out to local media and other civil society 
organizations and improve their communications strategies. 
 
 Expand and Improve the EU’s assistance for Russian NGOs 
 
Feedback from local actors highlights how EU’s initiatives have seriously 
suffered from the rigidity and inflexibility of funding procedures. There are 
many technical problems of EU’s financial instruments not being user-friendly. 
Therefore, the EU has paradoxically discourage rather than encourage 
Russian NGOs to benefit from EU funds. The establishment of a coordinating 
unit within the Commission and/or EU foundation to deal specifically with all 
assistance to NGOs is worth a serious consideration. In the meantime, the EU 
should re-design and simplify its contracting and accounting procedures and 
to become more responsive to NGOs requests. 
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• It is important to make application procedure more user-friendly: to 
publicize information about new tenders and issue calls for proposals 
well in advance. Although exact details may be provided at the time of 
the call, advance notice should provide tenders’ basic rationale and 
purpose. It is useful to organize regular informative campaign to 
communicate to local NGOs in various Russian regions opportunities, 
requirements and conditions of EU-funded programs. It is also useful to 
publicize a set of minimum standards and requirements for those 
NGOs that, in the view of the Commission, are eligible for EU funding. 
This information will eventually help NGOs in identifying the grants and 
programs which they can apply for; 
• It is important to find ways to simplify reporting procedures for EU-
funded projects. A growth in demand for written report and various 
financial reporting documents have gradually been tightened in Russia. 
NGO staff at all levels now put many hours into writing detailed reports 
to various Russian state agencies. Therefore, EU extremely tight 
reporting procedures are not well tailored to the reality of Russian 
NGOs, especially given that this reality has been dramatically 
challenged by new Russian legislation on NGOs.  
• It is important to provide funding for small local NGOs. At the moment, 
EU funding programs predispose it to large professional NGOs with the 
ability to meet EU cumbersome application and reporting requirements 
and, often, with a good command of English and good understanding 
of EU system. Certainly, many Russian human rights NGOs are run by 
experienced experts and project-managers and can cope with 
complicated EU schemes of funding. Yet, there are also many small 
and active NGOs, made up of people who work in many Russian 
regions and with strong social and human rights commitments. For 
many of them EU support would allow to survive and grow in a difficult 
environment, but most of these organizations cannot afford to engage 
in a battle for EU funding. It would be useful to establish new system of 
flexible micro-projects to bring EU support to these small local NGOs.  
 
 Put more focus on assessing and publicizing the stories of 
success and lessons learned from more than a decade of human 
rights assistance to Russia. A systematic “lessons learned” 
exercise, examining the effectiveness and shortcomings of human 
rights assistance given by the EU to Russia over the past decade, 
would help the EU develop more sophisticated and nuanced 
initiatives and provide further accountability for EU policies. What is 
also at stake here is the powerful signals about the ability of the EU 
to deliver results and to act as a problem-solver. 
 
